The employment effects of labor and product markets deregulation and their







Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft  















The Employment Effects of Labor and Product Markets 






















The Employment Effects of Labor and Product Markets Deregulation  
and Their Implications for Structural Reform1
 
 
Helge Berger (corresponding) Stephan Danninger 
Free University Berlin & CESifo International Monetary Fund 
Department of Economics  
Boltzmannstr. 20 700 19th Street, N.W. 
14195 Berlin Washington, DC 20431 
Germany U.S.A. 







This study explores the effects of market deregulation on employment growth. Empirical 
analysis of an OECD country panel (1990-2004) suggests that lower levels of product and 
labor market regulation foster employment growth, including through sizable interaction 
effects. A theoretical framework is developed for evaluating deregulation strategies in the 
presence of reform costs. Optimal deregulation takes various forms depending on the 
deregulation costs and the strength of reform interactions. Compared to the first best, 
decentralized decision-making can lead to excessive or insufficient deregulation. Securing 
the first best requires coordinating deregulation activities across sectors and overcoming the 
partial perspective of decision makers 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: L51, E24, J50 
 
Keywords: Product market regulation, labor market regulation, employment growth, policy 
coordination, sequencing 
                                                 
1 We are indebted to Alfonso Arpaia, Jörg Decressin, Marcello Estevão, Andy Hughes-Hallet, Giuseppe Nicoletti, 
Werner Schule, Marcel Thum, Bob Traa, and participants at the European Commission’s Workshop on Sequencing 
and Incentives of Reforms and the IMF’s European Department’s research seminar for insightful comments. Jair 
Rodriguez provided excellent research assistance. Helge Berger thanks the IMF for its hospitality.  The views 
expressed in this Working Paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF 
policy. 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Deregulation, despite its ample potential benefits, is not an easy feat. Policymakers often 
face formidable headwinds in implementing reform. In part, this resistance reflects the 
economic and political costs of deregulation. Structural change in product and labor 
markets—while increasing output and employment growth (e.g., OECD 2001 and 2005; 
Blanchard 2004)—invariably involves up-front costs, including frictional unemployment, 
and costs associated with scrapping or mobilizing fixed capital. Reforms often also entail 
some redistribution of income, generating political costs a social planner would ignore. 
As a result, policymakers tend to curtail or slow reforms thereby foregoing economic 
gains.  
Part of the difficulty in implementing structural reforms is that reforms are most effective 
if executed in a coordinated fashion. One recent example of a partial approach is 
Germany’s labor market reform (a.k.a. “Hartz IV”), which occurred against the backdrop 
of a highly regulated service sector––the largest economic sector in terms of employment. 
The reform has been criticized for its high implementation costs and lack of an apparent 
early success.2 But the benefits from partly liberalizing labor markets might have been 
(and might continue to be) small because high product market regulation constrains labor 
demand and, thus, dampens the positive employment effects. Ignoring these interactions 
biases policymakers’ anticipated reform benefits downward, leading—in the worst case—
to reform absence. 
Spillovers between labor and product market reform have shown to be important in many 
countries. For instance, using Italian micro data, Kugler and Pica (2004) show that the 
effects from changes in employment protection differ between industries depending on 
the competitive conditions in product markets. In particular, higher dismissal costs after 
legal changes in 1990 decreased the turnover rate for women, but the effect was smaller 
in sectors with higher barriers to entry on the product market side. Estevão (2005) shows 
in a dynamic panel framework for OECD member countries that the impact of lower 
labor costs on real GDP growth is larger with lower levels of product market regulation.  
Traditionally, economists endorse an unconditional elimination of regulatory barriers, as 
they act as a direct brake on economic activity no matter where they occur.3 However, 
this view tends to ignore reform spillovers on the benefit side. An implication of the 
model by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) is that sequential deregulation might have 
advantages. They show that greater competition in product markets reduces the rents 
available for redistribution in a union-firm bargaining process. Thus, by reforming the 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Fertig and Kluve (2004) and Boss and Elender (2005) for an analysis of the economic 
impact of recent German reforms, including Hartz IV. IMF (2005) notes that the fiscal costs associated with 
Hartz IV have been higher than expected and that implementation needs to be improved. 
3 There are, of course, a number of exceptions to the rule. See, for instance, the discussion in Kauppi and 
others (2004), who analyze the effects of simultaneous labor and product market imperfections on 
equilibrium unemployment under exogenous as well as endogenous capital intensity. Amabable and Gatti 
(2004) argue within an efficiency wage model with endogenous flows in and out of unemployment that 
product market reforms need not unambiguously increase employment due to adverse effects on workers’ 
incentives. 
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product market first, opposition to (and the political costs of) labor market reforms would 
decline and prepare the ground for further reforms. The more general question then 
becomes whether multiple reform strategies can be optimal, and if so, under what 
circumstances. 
The present paper adds to this discussion along two dimensions: first, by providing 
additional empirical evidence on the interaction of labor and product market reform with 
an emphasis on employment growth; and, second, by exploring the theoretical 
implications of deregulation spillovers for optimal policy design in the presence of reform 
costs. 
Empirical work on the employment effects of regulation is relatively scarce, with the 
exception of a recent study by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) using sectoral industry data 
in OECD countries.4 Most studies focus on the impact of regulation on other areas of 
economic activity such as productivity and investment, mostly confirming a detrimental 
effect (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003, Alesina and others, 2005, Conway, Janod, and 
Nicoletti, 2005). But these findings do not automatically generalize to employment 
growth.5 Our empirical results, based on an annual OECD panel during the period 1990-
2004, suggest that reducing product and labor market regulation indeed foster 
employment growth, including through sizable interaction effects.  
The most promising reform strategy is one of comprehensive deregulation with 
coordinated reform in the labor and product market. A country moving from median 
levels of regulation to par with the lowest decile of OECD countries stands to gain about 
1 percentage point in annual employment growth. On average, the growth contribution 
from coordinating reforms (across markets) is 17 percent of the total growth boost, but 
doubles with a larger reform effort (from 75th percentile of regulation to the lowest 
decile). While subject to some data caveats, mostly because of the lack of broad-based 
regulatory measures with sufficient time variation, the econometric results are 
surprisingly robust across estimators, specifications, and types of regulatory indicators. 
On the basis of these findings, we develop a framework for analyzing deregulation 
decisions in an environment where implementing reforms is costly. Two outcomes are 
compared: the regulation policies of a social planner with the decentralized choices of 
two market regulators. The analysis suggests that a partial perspective of market 
regulators leads to suboptimal deregulation outcomes, with the possibility of “too much” 
or “too little” reform depending on the decision process. Allowing one regulator to 
commit ex ante to a deregulation policy eliminates the case of excessive reform, but 
cannot prevent the possibility of suboptimal reform absence.  
                                                 
4 For examples of earlier work see Boeri and others (2000), Nicoletti and others (2001). 
5 Ebell and Haefke (2004) caution that, if there is sufficient excess employment prior to the reform—for 
instance, in the public sector—product market deregulation might lead to higher production without any 
measurable change in employment, rendering the employment effects of reforms largely an empirical 
question. Analyzing the interaction of labor and product market reform might also help understand the 
puzzling simultaneity of a dismal job-creation record and a declining wage share in output characterizing 
(with some exceptions) continental Europe in recent years.  
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Securing the first best in a decentralized environment requires not only coordinating 
deregulation activities across sectors but also overcoming the partial perspective of 
decision makers. If the market-by-market perspective is rooted in the political economy 
of regulation—for instance, because partial authorities will only receive public credit for 
their private efforts—this may require changing decision makers’ incentives and insulate 
them from public pressures. If the partial perspective is due to information deficits, for 
example, because of a lack of expertise in gauging the effects of the other authority’s 
regulatory activity, an organized information exchange between regulatory authorities 
might suffice. Another potential problem is the presence of political reform costs. For 
instance, a too short time horizon of policymakers or the need to appease organized 
interest groups can reduce perceived net benefits and lead to reform absence where a 
social planner would have opted for deregulation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II develops the intuition for 
the relevance of spillovers between labor and product market regulation based on the 
labor demand of a price-setting firm. Section III presents our empirical findings. Section 
IV discusses policy implications by comparing costly deregulation choices of a social 




II.   THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
The notion that broad-based or coordinated structural reforms create growth “synergies” 
has drawn attention in the literature lately. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argue that 
deregulation in product markets paves the way for competitive wage setting in the labor 
market, by reducing rents in the goods markets. As the scope for distribution between 
firms and workers shrinks, the wage bargaining process becomes less contentious and 
moderate wage setting encourages output and employment growth. Others highlight the 
loss of effectiveness of reforms focused on only one market. Krueger and Pischke (1997) 
stress that product market regulation such as start-up restrictions might reduce 
employment by limiting the labor demand reaction to labor costs. Kugler and Pica (2004) 
formalize a related idea using a matching model illustrating how entry barriers in the 
product market mitigate the impact of labor market deregulation. The OECD (2005) 
provides a recent survey of potential reasons why the effects of labor and product market 
reforms might be correlated.  
 
The intuition behind the interaction effect is that the employment impact of, say, labor 
market deregulation that boosts labor supply will be larger with lower product market 
regulation. The same is true for the impact of product market reform at different levels of 
labor market regulation. In combination lower levels of regulation generate an additional 
employment effect which exceeds the sum of the effects from isolated regulatory reforms. 
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The rationale can be derived within a simple static framework.6 Assume that firms 
operate under monopolistic competition in product markets, with the degree of 
competition decreasing in the level of product market regulation. It follows that firms 
demand less labor and become less responsive to wage changes the higher the level of 
product market regulation. The intuition is that higher product market regulation reduces 
the elasticity of demand firm’s face on the product market, which in turn reduces the 
impact of the real wage on optimal output and factor demand. As a consequence, if 
product market reforms increase competition and new firms enter the market, labor 
demand increases and becomes more sensitive to real wages.  
 
A similar situation can be outlined for labor supply, which is assumed to also depend on 
the level of labor market regulation. Higher regulation discourages workers from entering 
the market and thus deregulation increases labor supply and makes it more responsive to 
real wage changes: for instance, a reduction in employment protection makes employers 
more willing to hire workers while it weakens the position of unions in a right-to-manage 
bargaining framework (Estevão 2005). Also, a more flexible contractual framework leads 
to increases in the workforce.7 Quite plausibly less labor market reform will also 
contribute to a more wage elastic labor supply, which will influence the employment 
impact of shifts in the labor demand curve. 
 
The beneficial interaction benefit from coordinated reform arises in this model from the 
fact that deregulation makes labor supply and demand curves more elastic. The coincident 
flattening of both curves leads then to an employment effect that is stronger than what 




III.   EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF REGULATION 
A host of new data on regulatory activity allows us to test the economic significance of 
market regulation by comparing regulatory activity across sectors, countries, and over 
time. The general tenor of the empirical research so far is that excessive product market 
regulation has a measurable negative effect on economic activity and is at least partly 
responsible for divergences in economic performance among industrial countries. In 
particular, high regulation is associated with lower investment and multifactor 
productivity growth (Alesina and others, 2005, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; OECD, 
2005). There is also some evidence that wages are higher and hiring decisions are 
adversely affected by excessive regulation (Jean and Nicoletti, 2004).  The evidence 
regarding the impact of labor market regulation is somewhat more mixed—but a number 
of studies suggest a negative impact on real activity (OECD, 2004a; Nickell and others, 
2005; Young, 2003).  
 
                                                 
6 See Berger and Danninger (2005a) for an elaboration. The model provides an interpretation for the 
aggregate interaction effects estimated below, but is otherwise only illustrative since shifts or rotations of 
labor demand and supply curves cannot be identified with available data. 
7 Under the wage bargaining interpretation, regulation would influence the position of the so-called wage 
curve rather than the traditional labor supply. The analysis is otherwise comparable. 
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The presence of interaction effects between product and labor markets regulation has 
been the focus of a number of studies: Kugler and Pica (2004) find that labor market 
liberalization has larger positive employment effects in less regulated product markets. In 
other words, competitive barriers in product markets dampen the deregulation effects in 
labor markets. Estevão (2005) shows that wage moderation—measured by the 
productivity and unemployment level adjusted wage change—is more effective in 
stimulating growth if it occurs in countries with more deregulated product markets. Again 
the implication is that insufficient competition limits the benefits of labor market reforms. 
Annett and Debrun (2004) explore indirect evidence for the advantages of sequencing of 
reforms a là Blanchard and Giavazzi. They find that within the euro area, product market 
reforms Granger-cause labor market reforms suggesting sequential effects and one-
directional spillovers.8
 
This study examines the role of interaction effects on employment growth. Assuming 
monopolistic markets, deregulation should foster employment growth in line with the 
induced output growth.9 Our empirical strategy is to evaluate the impact of regulation in 
labor and product markets on aggregate employment growth. To this end we develop a 
panel data set of OECD countries by matching aggregate employment growth data with 
data on regulation indices. The following subsections describe the compilation of the data 
set, baseline results and robustness checks, and conclude with a discussion of the size of 
the estimated effects. 
 
A.   Data 
The analysis covers the years 1980-2004, with most regressions starting in 1990 in line 
with the availability of the regulation data.10 Employment is measured by the number of 
persons employed during a given year in the business sector. A preferable measure would 
have been total hours worked per year to capture movements between full and part-time 
employment, but this level of detail was not available for a sufficiently large number of 
countries. 
 
A limitation shared with all studies in the field is the lack of time variation in broad-based 
regulation indicators. The OECD country measures described below, while preferable in 
terms of their depth and coverage, are only available for a selected few years. An 
alternative set of indicators is the one developed by Nicoletti and others (2000) which 
                                                 
8 Burda (2000) discusses some of the earlier literature. See Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for an instructive 
discussion of the impact of taxation (in particular labor taxes) on unemployment and real growth in Europe. 
9 This claim is supported by evidence in Messina (2004) who finds the share of service sector employment 
in OECD countries is lower in more regulated product markets. However, as already noted, the theoretical 
implication is ambiguous. The presence of wage bargaining in a monopolistic market environment can also 
lead to excessive hiring of workers (e.g., Ebell and Haefke 2004 and 2005). An increase in competition 
through deregulation and the elimination of profitable margins of distribution would then reverse the 
overhiring, but need not increase employment. It is therefore an empirical question whether deregulation 
has positive employment effects. 
10 The full panel is used to support the use of lagged variables. The data source is the OECD (STAN) 
database and covers the following OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and United States. 
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contains annual regulatory indicators of overall regulation, barriers to entry, and public 
ownership in OECD member countries but is limited in its coverage to a limited number 
of non-manufacturing industries. Moreover, those data end in 1998, while the latest 
broad-based data include 2003.  
In light of these constraints, we opted for a dual approach. In the main part of the 
empirical exercise we work with the broad-based OECD data, relying on indicators for 
the years 1988, 1998, and 2003 for the labor market and 1998 and 2003 for product 
markets. Available data points are mapped forward annually until a new regulation data 
point was available. In addition, product market regulation during the years 1990-98 is 
assumed to be at the 1998 level. As a robustness check, we also present results based on 
the annual data by Nicoletti and others (2000). We find the results to be consistent. 
To exploit the existing (if limited) time variation of our broad-based regulatory indicators 
while safeguarding against spurious results, we make use of standard time-series panel 
techniques employing fixed or random effect estimators. An alternative approach would 
be to collapse the data set into a cross-country pool framework, treating missing 
observations on the regulatory indicators as unavailable. As a rule, this type of cross-
country analysis produces comparable results.11 But since there is little reason not to 
make use of the information contained in the within-country changes in regulatory 
activity, we report the panel results using fixed and random effects to prevent the slow-
moving regulatory indicators from picking up country effects. 
 
The OECD indicators of product market regulation capture different aspects of regulation 
that have the potential to limit competition.12 The study uses six of these measures: 
aggregate regulation, administrative regulation, economic regulation, barriers to 
entrepreneurship, degree of state control, and barriers to trade and investment. The 
regulation indicators take a value of zero when entry is free and a value of six when 
competition is severely restricted. Intermediate values represent partial liberalization of 
entry.  
 
Regulation of labor markets is captured by the OECD employment protection index 
(EPL) for the years 1988, 1998, and 2003 (OECD 2004a). EPL measures the strictness of 
legal protection of regular employment, temporary employment, and collective dismissals 
and are based on a similar scale of zero to six, with six indicating the highest degree of 
legal protection.13 The empirical findings rely mainly on the aggregate EPL index. In past 
research this indicator has successfully explained developments in different labor market 
segments, even though the evidence on overall unemployment effects is mixed (Arpaia 
and Mourre 2005, Young 2003, OECD 2004). Other data used in the study are taken from 
the OECD, the IMF World Economic Outlook, and the International Financial Statistics 
database. The data are merged into an annual panel.  
                                                 
11 Available on request. 
12 The OECD indicators were developed to illustrate broad differences in product market policies and are 
described in detail in Conway, Janod, and Nicoletti (2005). 
13 While both the OECD’s EPL and product market measure work with a zero-six scale, this does not mean 
that the intensity of regulation at a given level, say four, is directly comparable. We will return to this issue 
in the empirical application. 
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 B.   Empirical Results 
The baseline results are derived from an unrestricted dynamic model of employment 
growth. Special attention was given to interaction effects between product and labor 
market regulation:  
 
 
ΔEit =  α+ α1 ΔEi t-p+α2RPMt + α3RLMt + γ RPMt  x RLMt + δ Xit  + εit
 
where Δ is a general growth rate operator, p indicates the lag length chosen, and Xit refers 
to other control variables. 
 
The main findings are reported in Table 1. The empirical models differentiate between 
two definitions of the dependent variable: the models in the first two columns and column 
five measure employment growth as the average annual growth rate over a five year span 
to remove business cycle variations. The models in columns three, four, and six refer to 
the annual employment growth rate. Only the estimates for the regulation variables are 
shown. All models have a dynamic specification and also include other controls.14 
Models one and three are estimated with fixed effects and models two and four use 
random effects. Model five presents the results using lagged GDP growth as an 
instrument for the lagged dependent variable. The final model applies the GMM estimator 




                                                 
14 The left-hand-side variables exhibit significant autocorrelation. Alternative specifications that more 
directly test for cyclical effects found a positive association with lagged and current GDP growth. However, 
since GDP growth becomes insignificant in the presence of lagged dependent variables, and in order to 





Table 1. Employment Growth and Regulation: Annualized Five-year Growth, 1990-2003 1/ 
       
 Employment Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δ5 Et Δ5 Et ΔEt ΔEt Δ5 Et ΔEt
       
       
RPM -0.005 -0.006 -0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.0002 
 (1.52) (2.36)* (0.07) (2.35)* (1.06) (0.06) 
RLM -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 
 (3.37)*** (4.92)*** (2.45)** (2.11)** (3.72) *** (1.29) 
RPM x RLM 2/ 0.013 0.015 0.010 0.007 0.014 0.005 
 (3.95)** (5.40)*** (1.85) * (2.58)*** (4.16) *** (1.03) 
       
       
Estimation 3/ FE RE FE RE IV AB 
Observations 330 330 347 347 330 422 
Countries 27 27 28 28 28 28 
R-squared 0.01 0.14 0.29 38.7 50.6 ... 
Wald-Test 4/ 10.5*** 54.5*** 2.8** 13.5*** 11.3*** ... 
       
 
   Source: OECD and author’s estimates 
   Notes: absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10 percent, ** at the 5 percent, and *** significant 
at the 1 percent level. 
   1/ The dependent variable in models (1), (2), and (5) is the annualized employment growth rate (persons) averaged over 5 
years, in models (3), (4), and (6) it is the annual growth rate. Other control variables not shown in models (1), (2), and (5) 
are the five-year lag of the average growth. Models (3) and (5) include the first to the fifth lag of the annual employment 
growth rate. Model (5) is an instrumental variable estimation using the annualized real GDP growth rate averaged over 5 
years lagged five year as an instrument on the lagged dependent variable. The specification includes country dummies 
equivalent to a FE specification. Model (6) presents Arellano-Bond estimates based on a four lag structure and covers the 
period 1985-2004. All models include population size as a control for country size and a constant. Lagged dependent 
variables in all models are significant. Including current and/or lagged GDP growth does not qualitatively alter the results. 
The additional variable(s) are not statistically significant in the presence of the lagged endogenous variable. The role of 
further control variables is discussed further below. 
   2/ Dummy interaction effect. 1 if both labor and product market regulation are at or above the average level of the sample 
of OECD countries, and 0 otherwise.  
   3/ FE=fixed effects, RE=random effects,  IV= instrumental variables,  AB= Arellano-Bond.  






The first aspect worth noticing in Table 1 is the consistent sign pattern of the estimated 
coefficients across models. The direct effect of market regulation is negative while the 
interaction term has an offsetting positive effect in all specifications. Although product 
market regulation is not always statistically significant,15 Wald-tests indicate joint 
significance of all three regulation variables. The interaction term is a dummy variable 
and set to be equal to one if a country has above average product and labor market 
regulation and zero otherwise. This specification avoids potential compatibility problems 
with the metric of the two indicators and provides a better fit than a multiplicative term.16 
We show results for both random and fixed effects estimators.17  
 
The empirical results provide evidence of cross-market synergies from deregulation in 
both markets. This can be demonstrated by analyzing the employment effect of partial 
deregulation. The full impact of partial changes is the sum of the direct impact and the 
offsetting effects from the interaction term. The model parameters imply that the 
(marginal) employment effect from deregulating one market increases as the level of 
regulation decreases in the other market, thus reflecting positive synergies from joint 
deregulation.  
 
In general, the estimated net effect of partial deregulation is positive, that is, enhances 
employment growth––but for a few countries, however, the marginal reform effect 
becomes negative due to a large offsetting interaction term. This somewhat 
counterintuitive result highlights the importance of the cross-market spillover: a partial 
deregulation effort in one market at very high levels of regulation in the other is not 
guaranteed to be successful. But the result is reversed as the level of regulation in the 
other market falls and does not appear in most deregulation scenarios (see Table 5 
below).  
  
In order to understand better which regulation channels affect employment growth, we 
also explore the relative importance of different subcomponents of the regulation indices. 
The results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. To assess the effects of labor market 
regulation, we estimate the effects of three subindices measuring the degree of 
employment protection of regular employment, temporary employment, and large-scale 
dismissals. Columns (1) to (4) in Table 2 compare the estimates for the overall index with 
its subcomponents. The largest negative employment effects stem from employment 
protection of full-time employment and large-scale dismissals. Regulations affecting 
temporary employment seem to play a smaller role. These results suggest that 
                                                 
15 A plausible explanation is inflated standard errors due to the positive correlation of the regulation 
variables. Product market regulation is statistically significant in models which exclude labor market 
regulation and the interaction term (see below). Note, however, that the tests for joint significance of the 
regulatory indicators. Thus, while the problem of their possible multicollinearity pervades the empirical 
literature in its entirety, it does not seem to be a major problem in the baseline results presented here. See 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) for a recent discussion and an attempt to limit the issue by way of generating 
synthetic regulatory indicators.  
16 The multiplicative interaction terms consistently come out with a positive sign, but are not always 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
17 Although the Hausman specification tests rejects the hypothesis of consistency of random effects in favor 
of the fixed effect model, there is a potential conflict between using fixed effects and the less time variation 
of the regulatory indicators. 
 9
employment protection interferes with job growth primarily by raising the cost of regular 
full-time employment contracts.   
 
Analysis of product market subindices hint at increased costs for creating new jobs (Table 
3). Columns (1) to (6) present the overall index compared to five subcomponents. 
Employment growth is mostly hampered by a high administrative burden and barriers to 
entrepreneurship, trade, and investment. Comparatively less important are economic 
regulations—for instance, through price ceilings or quotas—or excessive state control in 
the form of public ownership. Although still based on fairly general indicators, the 
findings suggest that regulation especially hampers job creation in startups or small firms 
as they are most sensitive to administrative burdens and barriers to entry of 
entrepreneurship and investment. This interpretation is consistent with large competitive 
barriers in the service sector in several European countries, where most small enterprises 
are concentrated (Berger and Danninger, 2005b). 
 
 
Table 2. Employment Growth and Regulation: EPL Subindices, 1990-2004 1/ 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Change in Employment 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Δ5Et Δ5Et Δ5Et Δ5Et  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RLM -0.007     
 (3.62)***     
Regular Employment -0.016    
  (5.06)***    
Temp.  Employment   -0.003   
   (2.49)**   
Collective Dismissal    -0.015 
    (3.08)*** 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations 330 330 330 170 
Countries 27 27 27 27 
Estimation 2/ FE FE FE FE 
R2 (within) 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.55 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   Notes: absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10 percent, ** at the 5 percent, and 
*** significant at the 1 percent level. 
   1/ Dependent variable is annualized employment growth rate average over five years. Regulation 
subindices measure regulation of regular employment contracts, regulation of temporary employment 
contracts, and regulation of collective dismissals. Estimation technique is fixed effects. Models include 5-
year lagged dependent variable, population size, fixed effects, and a constant. Lagged dependent variables 
are significant. 




Table 3. Employment Growth and Regulation: Product Market Regulation Subindices 1990-2004 1/ 
       
 Change in Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δ5 Et Δ5 Et ΔEt ΔEt Δ5 Et Δ5Et
       
RLM -0.008      
 (2.83)***      
Administrative  -0.009     
Regulation  (3.78)***     
Economic Regulation   -0.003    
   (1.34)    
Barriers to Trade and    -0.009   
Investment    (2.66)***   
Extent of State Control     -0.004  
     (1.98)**  
Barriers to       -0.009 
Entrepreneurship      (3.32)*** 
       
       
       
       
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 330 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 (within) 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.25 
       
       
 
   Source: OECD and author’s estimates. 
   Notes: absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10 percent, ** at the 5 percent, and *** significant 
at the 1 percent level. 
   1/ The dependent variable is annualized employment growth rate average over five years. Regulation subindices measures 
the level of administrative regulation, level of economic regulation, barriers to trade and investment, extent of state control, 
and barriers to entrepreneurship. Models include five-year lagged dependent variable, population size, fixed effects, and a 






C.   Robustness Checks 
Several different modifications to the baseline model were examined to assess the 
robustness of the baseline results. In a first step different control variables commonly 
associated with employment activity, either from the demand or the supply side, were 
added to examine the scope of an omitted variable bias (see, e.g. Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta 2005). One potential factor suggested in the literature is the tax wedge on labor 
which increases the cost of labor and thereby could reduce employment growth. Adding 
either the level or the growth rate of the tax wedge—both are highly significant—does not 
alter the sign or joint significance of the regulation effects. Similarly, controlling for 
union density or the coverage of collective bargaining—both variables are insignificant—
has no effect on the baseline results.18 We also test for heterogeneity across regional 
country groupings but do not detect a country cluster effect (e.g., transition economies). 
 
To control for the potential endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable an instrumental 
variable (IV) model is estimated with lagged GDP growth as an instrument. The IV 
model produces the same sign and significance patterns of the regulation effects as in the 
baseline model.19 To deal with potential estimation problems arising from the dynamic 
panel specification, the annual model was reestimated using the procedure proposed by 
Arellano-Bond. Again the sign-pattern of the regulation effects remained intact although 
the coefficients were no longer statistically significant.20 These results are reported in 
columns (5) and (6) of Table 1. 
 
Next, we see whether the qualitative results from the cross-country panel hold up in a 
industry-level data set. The main benefit of the alternative panel is higher frequency data 
on product and labor market regulation, but with the drawback of covering an earlier time 
period (1980-98), includes fewer countries (six), and restricts the analysis to just four non 
manufacturing sectors.21 Annual product markets regulation data come from Nicoletti and 
others (2000) and have been used in explaining relative economic performance (e.g., 
Alesina and others, 2005). Data on employment protection legislation are taken from 
Table 12 in Nickell (2003) to obtain an elongated time-series. All other industry data 
come from the OECD STAN database.  
 
Results from baseline regressions on this panel confirm the presence of negative 
regulation effects with cross-market interactions. Table 4 presents the sectoral regulation 
effects for two model specifications using five year and annual employment growth rates. 
The model specifications are the same as in Table 1, but also include industry dummies. 
The Hausman specification test suggests random effects to be the preferable model. In 
both the five-year average and the annual specification, the same regulation pattern 
                                                 
18 Data sources for the tax wedge are OECD “Taxing Wages” (various issues). Union density and collective 
bargaining coverage are taken from Nickell (2003), tables 8 and 9. Results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
19 All three regulation variables were jointly significant at the 1 percent level. All were individually 
significant with the exception of product market regulation.  
20 Given the fact that this procedure was developed for large micro-data panels, and due to the limited time 
variation of the current sample, the applicability of the dynamic panel estimator is doubtful. 
21 Electricity production, telecommunications, transportation, and postal services. 
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emerges. The sign pattern is the same as in the cross-country panel and at least in the case 
of the five-year growth rates, the estimated effects are statistically significant.22  
 
Table 4. Employment Growth and Regulation: 
Industry Level Data 1980-98 1/ 
 






RPM -0.006 -0.527 
 (2.69)** (1.47) 
RLM -0.023 -1.715 
 (3.48)** (1.81) 
RPM x RLM 0.005 0.367 
 (3.13)** (1.44) 
   
Estimation 2/ RE RE 
Observations 103 183 
Countries 6 6 
Sectors 4 4 
R-squared 0.62 0.32 
Wald-Test 3/ 7.1** 4.7 
 
   Source: OECD and author’s estimates 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 
10 percent ** at 5 percent *** significant at 1 percent. 
   1/ Sectoral employment growth (persons) in four non-
manufacturing industries (electricity production, 
telecommunications, transportation, and postal services) 
covering the years 1980-88 sourced from the OECD STAN 
database. Market regulation indicators are taken from 
Nicoletti and others (2000) and Nickell (2003) Table 12. 
Baseline regressions include sectoral dummy variables and in 
model one a five-year lag of the dependent variable and in 
models two the first to the fifth lag. Lagged dependent 
variables are significant. Interaction term is the product of the 
market regulation indicators.  
   2/ RE=random effects. 
   3/ Test of joint significance of regulation variables. 
 
 
                                                 
22 The results are at odds with Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005). Using an extended sectoral data set up to 
2002 and a selection of labor market regulation indicators, they find evidence of complementarities between 
product market regulation and labor market policies, implying that product market deregulation will yield 
larger employment gains at higher levels of labor market regulation. While the empirical studies are hard to 
compare for a number of reasons, including differences in specification and estimation techniques, this 
suggests that at the sectoral level the sign of the interaction term may be somewhat less informative than at 
the cross-country level. 
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D.   The Economic Impact of Deregulation 
Estimates of the employment growth effects from deregulation are presented in Table 5. 
The calculations are based on two different reform strategies (comprehensive and partial) 
and two levels of the deregulation effort (small and large). A comprehensive reform is 
defined as coordinated deregulation in both the product and labor markets (i.e., a decline 
of the regulation index in both markets). A partial reform is a unilateral decrease of the 
regulation index in only one market. A large deregulation effort represents movement 
from the 75h to the 10th percentile in the OECD distribution of the respective regulation 
index, a small reform effort is defined as a decline in the regulation level from the median 
to the 10th percentile. When conducting a partial reform experiment, we assume that the 
level of regulation in the non reforming market remains at the pre-reform level.  
 
The economic effects appear to be large in all reform scenarios, irrespective of which 
empirical model is applied. The first five columns in Table 5 report the annual 
employment growth effect based on different empirical models (see Table 1). The 
average effect across models is reported in the last column.  Partial reforms lead on 
average to additional employment growth of between 0.5 or 0.6 percent across all models. 
The size of the effort does not change the result much. Comprehensive reform trivially 
doubles the impact to between 1.0 and 1.2 percent simply because it involves a double 
effort in both markets.  
 
However, in addition, policy coordination also generates a positive synergy effect due to 
the interaction term identified in the empirical exercise. This effect can be measured by 
the difference between the sum of partial product and labor market deregulation and a 
comprehensive reform. On average, coordinating reform efforts across markets increases 
the estimated employment effects by about 17 percent in the small effort scenario (i.e., 
the shift from median to 10th percentile) and by 38 percent in the large effort scenario 
(75th to 10th percentile). And while the size of the estimated effects varies substantially 






     Table 5. Employment Effect from Partial and Comprehensive Deregulation 1/ 
Model 3/ A A B B A B
Technique 4/ FE RE FE RE IV AB Mean
75pct → 10 pct
Average growth effect 1.3 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.6
Median → 10 pct
Average growth effect 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.5
75pct  → 10 pct
Overall effect 3.0 1.5 1.5 0.9 2.1 0.8 1.6
o/w coordination 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.5
%  increase over partial reform 15.6 210.3 15.4 213.2 27.0 6.6 38.4
Median → 10 pct
Overall effect 1.9 1.2 1.0 0.7 1.4 0.5 1.1
o/w coordination 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2
%  increase over partial reform 7.9 44.1 7.5 45.6 12.6 3.5 16.6
Comprehensive reform 2/
Partial Reform 2/
   Source: Author’s calculations.  
   1/ Reported estimates measure annual employment growth impact. 
   2/ Partial policy simulations refers to a move from 50th to the 10th percentile on the regulation index in 
one market. Comprehensive reform refers to a simultaneous move to the 10th percentile in both markets.  
   3/ Model A based on five-year averages,  model B on annual data. See Table 1 for details. 
   4/ FE=fixed effects, RE=random effects, IV= instrumental variable, AB= Arellano-Bond.  
 
 
IV.   IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION 
One implication of the empirical results is that optimal deregulation policies need to take 
into account direct as well as indirect interaction effects across markets. A benevolent 
social planner, who takes a holistic view of the economy, would internalize such effects 
and consider de-regulation in both the labor and product market to maximize overall 
welfare. Of course, in actual decisions policymakers often take a market-by-market 
perspective. As we will show below, such a partial perspective will, as a rule, lead to 
inefficient policy results in the presence of sizable interaction effects. 
 
In addition to the economic benefits of deregulation, decision makers also take into 
account its economic costs. Such costs may include transaction costs—for instance, 
frictional unemployment or the cost of moving or scrapping physical capital—that occur 
when resources are being reallocated to more efficient uses.23 Any decision maker will 
weigh the benefits of a particular reform scenario on both the labor and product markets 
with costs and proceed only if there is a net benefit.24 These costs need therefore be an 
integral part of the decision model. 
                                                 
(continued…) 
23 The report of the Australian Competition Commission (2004) provides a comprehensive account of such 
costs. Hallet, Jensen, and Richter (2005) show that high upfront costs can be another source for no reform.  
24 Actual decision-making may be also influenced by political costs. For instance, interest groups will try to 
influence the distributional effects of a reform or politicians might take into account the potential loss of 
votes from the displaced workers and their dependents. Because the social planner would ignore political 
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In the remainder of the section, we compare optimal deregulation policies for centralized 
and decentralized decision making. The decision to deregulate is modeled by assessing 
the net benefits from reforms of the labor and/or product markets. The model illustrates 
the rationale for policy-coordination across sectors and thus explains when a social and 
when a partial planner would reform. Differences depend on the degree of internalization 
of market specific benefits and the possibility to communicate between multiple decision 
makers. 
 
A.   Social Planner 
Deregulation policies will be implemented when their marginal benefit exceeds the 
marginal cost.25 The stylized facts from the empirical section suggest that employment 
growth or, more generally, benefits (B) have the general form  
 
,PMLMPMPMLMLM RRRRB γ+α−α−α=  
 
where the α terms as well as γ are positive constants and the Ri, with i=LM, PM, are the 
measures of the level of regulatory activity in the labor and product market introduced 
earlier. A second assumption based on the impact simulations summarized in Table 5 is 
that the net change in benefits stemming from partial reform in either market will be 
positive, that is, for i=LM, PM we have 
 
0>γ−α ≠ii R . 
 
Moreover, to keep the model tractable, we make a number of technical assumptions. First, 
regulation can only take two values, high and low, { , }i iiR R R= . Second, the status quo 
in both markets is a high level of regulation. Third, the economic cost of deregulation 




Optimal Strategies  
 
Given the discrete setup, the single planner will either decide to reform both markets, not 
reform at all, or reform only one market. When will the planner implement full reform? 
The condition for the planner to prefer full reform over no reform in either market is that 
the net-benefits (taking into account reform costs) in the former case exceed net-benefits 
in the latter 
                                                                                                                                                  
costs, however, taking them into account (just like taking a partial perspective on benefits) will lead to 
suboptimal policy results. See section D below. 
25 This is true no matter the specific nature of these costs. To the extent that marginal costs reflect economic 
(or transaction) costs, the rule ensures first-best efficiency. Policy failure arises, if marginal political costs 
are the decisive factor in upholding regulation in any market, while a comparison of benefits and economic 
costs alone would suggest otherwise. Given informational constraints, the rule might still yield a second-
best result, however. 
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( ) ( i i i ii i i ii i i i i iR R R R C C R R R Rα α γ α α γ≠ ≠≠ ≠≠ ≠ ≠− − + − − − − − + ≥) 0 , 
 
which implies after some manipulations 
 
( )i ii i i i i i i iR R R R R R Cα α γ ≠≠ ≠ ≠ ≠Δ + Δ − Δ + Δ ≥ +C . 
 
From a similar argument the condition for full reform dominating partial reform can be 
derived as 
 ( ) iiii CRR ≠≠≠ ≥γ−αΔ . 
 
When both conditions hold, the planner will deregulate both the product and the labor 
market. In Figure 1, spanning the space of possible reform cost combinations, this area 
refers to the grey-colored area marked by relatively low levels of reform costs in both 
markets around the origin.  
 
Following the same logic, the planner will prefer partial reform of market i over no 
reform if 
 ( ) iiii CRR ≥γ−αΔ ≠ , 
 
and partial reform of market i over full reform if 
 ( ) iiii CRR ≠≠≠ <γ−αΔ . 
 
Because of the symmetry of the setup, similar conditions hold for the ≠i market. In 
Figure 1, the cost-combinations (Ci, C≠i) meeting these conditions are depicted by the 
horizontal-striped areas in the upper left and lower right. 
 
Finally, the planner will choose no reform if the net-benefits from full deregulation are 
negative, that is when we have  
 ( ) iiiiiiiiii CCRRRRRR ≠≠≠≠≠ +<Δ+Δγ−αΔ+αΔ , 
 
and, at the same time, the net-benefits of no reform exceed the net-benefits of partial 
reform 
 ( ) iiii CRR <γ−αΔ ≠ . 
 
In Figure 1, the cost-combinations fulfilling both conditions are marked by the 
downward-striped area to the right of the (A, A)-line parting the no reform from the full 
reform area, and to the right and above the partial reform areas. 
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Figure 1 illustrates that, in the presence of reform costs, full deregulation may not always 
be optimal even from a first-best perspective. While the social planner will reform both 
the labor and the product market when deregulation is associated with symmetrical low 
reform costs, the planner may leave regulation at high status quo levels if reform costs are 
sufficiently high. And, despite the planner’s overall perspective, optimal reform may take 
the form of only partial deregulation in scenarios were reform costs are asymmetrically 
high in either the labor or the product market. The question is, however, how well 
decision-makers with a restricted partial perspective will perform against this benchmark. 
 
B.   Partial Decision Makers 
In the political sphere, the decisions to deregulate are rarely within one hand. More often 
than not, product and labor market regulation are implemented and overseen by different 
entities—for instance, a national competition authority and a government department in 
charge of social and labor market affairs. And even at the legislative level multiple 
decision makers may be involved if, as within the EU, product market regulation is 
subject to both national and international authority. Moreover, different branches of the 
judiciary may be involved in the regulation of labor and product markets. To capture the 
essence of the problem, in what follows we will assume that two separate authorities are 
charged with determining the level of regulatory activity in the labor and the product 
market. 
 
With more than one decision maker involved, the question of perspective arises. A 





( )iii RR γ−αΔ ≠≠  
PARTIAL 
( )i ii i i i i iR R R R R Rα α γ ≠≠ ≠ ≠Δ + Δ − Δ + Δ ≡A 
(i only) A 
( )iii RR γ−αΔ ≠≠  
( )iii RR ≠γ−αΔ ( )iii RR ≠
PARTIAL 
(≠i only) 
Δ α − γ
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not fully internalize the full benefit of labor and product market regulation in determining 
employment growth.26 In particular, we will assume that the benefits considered are 
 
iiiii RRRB ≠γ+α−α= , 
 
with i=LM, PM . That is, while both regulatory authorities take into account the indirect 
interaction term pre-multiplied by γ, they are ignorant of the direct repercussions of the 
other agency’s regulatory activity—that is, the term iiR≠≠α , present in the social planner’s 
benefit function, is missing in partial decision maker i’s target function. This may be the 
case because, from a political economy perspective, partial authorities will only receive 
public credit for their private efforts or because they lack the expertise or information to 
precisely gauge the direct effect of the other authority’s regulatory activity on the other 
market. 
 
In what follows, we explore the consequences of the decision maker’s partial perspective 
using two standard environments. The setups differ in the level of information and 
commitment power available to the two regulators. In the first model, decision makers 
move simultaneously in a Nash game based on only expectations about each other’s 
actions without prior information exchange or the ability to pre-commit on strategies. In 
the second model, decision makers move sequentially, with one authority acting first as a 
Stackelberg leader and the second one following suite after having observed the first 
regulator‘s actions. Because both setups may be relevant from a practical perspective, we 
discuss them in turn, and compare the outcomes with the first-best benchmark developed 
in the previous section. 
 
Simultaneous Reform Model 
 
This section assumes that both regulators decide and implement reform at the same time. 
Since both decision makers lack commitment power and cannot exchange information 
about their strategies, a coordination problem arises for some cost constellations. The 
analysis below shows that both “too little” and “too much” reform is possible. These 
inefficiencies are however only partly due to a lack of communication as the sequential 
model demonstrates further below.  
 
A natural equilibrium concept in the simultaneous setup are (pure strategy) Nash-
equilibria, which implies that in equilibrium the regulation-outcome (Ri*,R ≠i*) has the 
property that:  
 
Wi  (Ri*, R ≠i*)  ≥ Wi  (Ri, R ≠i*) and 
W≠i  (Ri*, R ≠i*) ≥ W≠i  (Ri*, R ≠i). 
                                                 
26 The objective functions of market regulators can be interpreted as utility functions. Alternatively, one 
could think also of two bureaucrats maximizing sectoral employment growth functions, that each regulator 
would consider a production function with the functional form i i i i iE R R Rα α γ ≠Δ = − + , which adds up to 
total employment growth  i(1 )iE E Eν ν ≠Δ =  where ν is the market i’s weight in total employment 
growth. This setup leads to excessive reform activity beyond what the utility function approach implies. 
Additional results are available on request. 
Δ + − Δ
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A first sub-class of equilibria relevant in this setup involves dominant strategies. A 
dominant strategy for one player is given when payoffs from playing one particular 
strategy, say reform, are always at least as high as playing the other strategy (e.g., no-
reform), regardless of what the other regulator does. A second class of equilibria is 
relevant in the absence of dominant strategies. In this case we have to look for mutual 




Without an opportunity to commit to a strategy in advance, both players have to weigh 
their choices at different regulation levels of the other market. The optimal choice will 
depend on the level of reform costs. Obviously, neither player will conduct a reform if 
deregulation costs are prohibitively high: 
 ( ) iiii CRR <γ−αΔ ≠ , 
 
for i=LM, PM, which makes no reform a dominant strategy at these cost levels.  
 
At cost levels below this threshold, each player’s optimal reform decision will be a 
reaction to the assumed or expected reform activity of the other player. Assuming that the 
other player will not reform, i.e. ii RR ≠≠ = , player i will choose to reform if 
 ( ) iiii CRR ≥γ−αΔ ≠ . 
 
This implies that, because a high level of regulatory activity represents the status, player i 
has a second dominant strategy: for cost levels sufficiently low, i will reform no matter 
player ≠i’s reform decision.  On the other hand, expecting that the other player will 
reform, i.e. ii RR ≠≠ = , player i will choose to reform if 
 ( ) iiii CRR ≥γ−αΔ ≠ , 
 
 
which implies that player i will reform if player ≠i does as well. Figure 2 summarizes the 




( )iii RR γ−αΔ ≠≠  
( )iii RR ≠γ−αΔ  
≠i never reforms 
≠i reforms if i does 
≠i always reforms 




if ≠i does 
i always 
reforms 
[7] [8] [9] 
[4] [5] [6] 
[1] [2] [3] 
( )iii RR ≠γ−αΔ
( )iii RR γ−αΔ ≠≠
 
 
Referring to the areas marked in the graph, we can distinguish a number of relevant 
equilibrium constellations involving dominant strategies: 
 
 
[1] reform dominating for i and ≠i: full reform 
[2] & [4] reform dominating for i and ≠i follows & vice versa: full reform 
[3] & [7] reform (no reform) dominating for ≠i (for i) & vice versa: partial reform 
[6] & [8] no reform dominating for i and ≠i follows & vice versa: no reform 
[9] no reform dominating for i and ≠i: no reform 
 
 
The coordination game 
 
Before we turn to a fuller description of the implied equilibria, we discuss area [5], the 
one region identified in Figure 2 where neither player follows a dominant strategy.  
This area has the feature of a classical coordination game. The combination of 
deregulation costs is such that positive net-benefits from reform occur only if the other 
player also reforms, that is, we have: 
 
Player i:   ( ) ( )i ii i i i iR R C R Rα γ α γ≠ ≠Δ − < ≤ Δ − , 
Player ≠i: ( ) ( )i ii i i i iR R C R Rα γ α γ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠Δ − < ≤ Δ − . 
 
In this situation neither player has certainty about the other player’s move, forcing each 
player to work out best responses to a given (or expected) move by the other. It can be 
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shown that in this intermediate cost region two pure-strategy Nash equilibria exist: no 
reform and full reform. The equilibria are intuitively the reflection of a common “belief
by the regulators about the level of reform willingness and can either lead to a full-refo
or no-reform outcome. Note however that these equilibria can deviate from the socially 
optimal deregulation decision and imply “too much” or “too little” reform.  As a 
comparison of Figures 1 and 2 demonstrates, the simultaneous game can lead to no- 
reform in the cost range of area 5 below the diagonal line, and to full reform abov





No reform equilibrium: Assume that player i chooses no reform, iR , in equilibrium, then 
 does not pay for ≠i to deviate from no-reform if:  it
 
( )ii i iR Rα γ C≠ ≠Δ − < ≠  
In the relevant cost region this condition always holds. A similar condition holds for 
player i. Thus no-reform is an equilibrium strategy. 
 
 
Full reform equilibrium: Assume that player i chooses reform, iR , in equilibrium, then it 
ould pay for ≠i to reform as well if w
 
R ( )ii i iR Cα γ≠ ≠ ≠Δ − ≥ , 
and a similar condition holds for i, and both are fulfilled in the relevant cost region. Thus, 
full-reform is also an equilibrium strategy.  
ther Equilibria and Welfare Analysis 
r of cases, the equilibria are similar to the choice 







Figure 3 sums up the results. In a numbe
o
reform equilibria at symmetrically low and symmetrically high levels of deregulation 
costs, where both players implement dominant strategies (i.e., grey and striped areas 
around [1] & [9] in Figure 2). Familiar from the social planner setup, too, are the partia
reform equilibria with highly asymmetrical deregulation costs, where the dominant 





( )iii RR γ−αΔ ≠≠
 
( )iii RR γ−αΔ ≠≠
 
Figure 3. Simultaneous Model Equilibria 
( )iii RR ≠γ−αΔ ( )iii RR ≠γ−αΔ
( )iiiiii RRRRR ≠≠ −γ−αΔ
Partial reform: 
0,0 >Δ=Δ ≠ii RR  
Partial reform: 
0,0 =Δ>Δ ≠ii RR  
( )i ii i i i i iR R R R R Rα α γ ≠≠ ≠ ≠Δ + Δ − Δ + Δ ≡A 
A 
Full or No reform: 
0=Δ=Δ ≠ii RR  
  0, >ΔΔ ≠ii RR  
Full reform: 0, >ΔΔ ≠ii RR  
No reform: 
0=Δ=Δ ≠ii RR  [7] [8] [9] 
[4] [5] [6] 




More reform does not necessarily mean optimal reform, however. If neither player has a 
dominant strategy (area [5]), two Nash equilibria are possible, which can deviate from the 
socially optimal choice. The deeper reason for the inefficiency in the coordination game 
is the interaction term combined with a partial perspective. The interaction term creates 
the interdependence between both reforming authorities. In contrast to the social planner, 
the partial authorities ignore the direct and indirect repercussions of their actions on the 
other market. The planner would take into account the direct effects of reform efforts in 
either market as well as their interaction effects. Internalizing all direct effects leads the 
planner to opt for a full reform effort in excess of the full reform result secured by 
dominating strategies for partial authorities: the planner will always reform both markets 
if reform costs are within the checkered area but below the (A,A)-line. Taking full 
account of the interaction effect induces the planner to refrain from reform in cost 
constellations within the checkered area but above the (A,A)-line.27  
 
The next section examines to what extent communication between regulators through 
sequential decision making can avoid such inefficiencies. 
 
 
                                                 
27 Refining the Nash equilibrium concept could help to eliminate one of the two equilibria in the 




The idea of reform sequencing has at least two dimensions. The first concerns the 
sequence of decision making as such. Given the multitude of decision makers at the 
legislative, judicative, and executive level involved, it is probably save to assume that at 
any given moment deregulation in one market i will be determined ahead of market ≠i, 
taking the following authority’s action into account. For instance, effective labor market 
regulation is often influenced by labor courts which may reduce the speed of regulatory 
change in this sector of the economy. Or, if a reduction in employment protection requires 
changing labor court behavior itself—through changes in the appointment procedure of 
judges, say—the process will take relatively long. This could to translate into a first-
mover advantage for the authority overseeing (or initiating) labor market regulation vis-à-
vis the product market regulation authority. On the other hand, a hard-negotiated product 
market deregulation involving multiple national governments (e.g., by way of a trade 
liberalization or EU action) may have the power to reverse relative commitment power, 
turning the labor market regulation authority into a Stackelberg follower. In all other 
aspects—regarding preferences, reform costs, and notation—the model is similar to the 
simultaneous game. 
 
A second dimension of the sequential game concerns the timing of the reform effect: 
when do the effects of deregulation produce economic effects? Although a core question, 
there is little knowledge about the relative speed with which reform in the labor and 
product market influence employment growth. Moreover, these effects will take some 
time to fully develop. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the effect of reforms 
occur at the same time. This leaves us with the following sequence of events for i=LM, 
PM: 
 
Stage 1:  i decides on Ri  and credibly commits to its decision 
Stage 2:  ≠i decides on R≠i  
Stage 3:  simultaneous implementation and payoffs   
 
Under full information and certainty, the equilibrium of the game between the two 
players, the regulatory authorities in market i and ≠i, can be found by recursively solving 
the optimization problems.  
 
Deregulation at Stage 2 
 
Player ≠i’s welfare is 
 
i i i i iW R R R iCα γ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠= − − − . 
 
Given the sequence of events, player ≠i takes player i’s decision as given. If player i does 
not reform, i.e.  if ii RR = , player ≠i will reform if 
 ( ) iiii CRR ≠≠≠ ≥γ−αΔ . 
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On the other hand, if player i does reform, i.e. if ii RR = , player ≠i will reform if 
 ( ) iiii CRR ≠≠≠ ≥γ−αΔ . 
 
Note that the cost threshold in the latter case, ( )iii RR γ−αΔ ≠≠ , is higher than in the 














Deregulation at Stage 1 
 
Player i operates under full information, guided by a welfare function symmetrical to ≠i’s, 
 
ii i i iW R R R iCα γ ≠= − − − , 
 
and taking ≠i’s decision rule into account. In particular, player i’s deregulation decision 
depends on ≠i’s response to the first stage reform decision. We will discuss the three 
ensuing scenarios in turn. 
 
(a) Player ≠i always reforms: In this case, player i will reform if 
 ( ) iiii CRR ≥γ−αΔ ≠ . 
 
(b) Player ≠i reforms only if player i reforms: Given players ≠i’s decision rule, player i’s 
choice boils down to choosing between a situation in which both players reform and a 
situation in which neither player reforms. Thus, player i will reform and chose the former 
scenario if 
 ( ) iiiiiii CRRRRR ≥−γ−αΔ ≠≠ . 
 
(c) Player ≠i never reforms: In this case, player i will reform if 
 ( ) iiii CRR ≥γ−αΔ ≠ . 
 
It is straightforward to show that the cost thresholds for the three cases can be ranked  
 ( )iiiiii RRRRR ≠≠ −γ−αΔ  < ( )iii RR ≠γ−αΔ  < ( )iii RR ≠γ−αΔ , 
 
that is, the cost threshold in scenario (b) is smaller than the threshold in (c), which is 
smaller than the one in (a). Note that for (b) < (c) we require iiiiii RRRRRR ≠≠≠ Δ>−  or  




Equilibria and Welfare Analysis 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the resulting recursive finite game full information equilibria. 
C≠i 
Ci 
( )iii RR γ−αΔ ≠≠
 
( )iii RR γ−αΔ ≠≠
 
Figure 4. Equilibria of the Sequential Game 
( )iii RR ≠γ−αΔ ( )iii RR ≠γ−αΔ
( )iiiiii RRRRR ≠≠ −γ−αΔ
No reform: 
0=Δ=Δ ≠ii RR  
Partial reform: 
0,0 >Δ=Δ ≠ii RR  
Partial reform: 
0,0 =Δ>Δ ≠ii RR  
Full reform: 0, >ΔΔ ≠ii RR  
 
 
Comparing the results with the first-best benchmark (Figure 1), we find the reform effort 
in the sequential game to fall short at intermediate cost levels.28 While the limited 
perspective of the decentralized authorities comes at no social cost in the partial reform 
areas—the partial reform regions marked by horizontal stripes at the top left and bottom 
right of Figure 4 are similar to the respective areas in Figure 1—the (solid grey) full 
reform area around the origin is smaller than the relevant area determined by the social 
planner. On the other hand the sequential decision making no longer implies the 
possibility of excessive reform as identified in the simultaneous setup (Figure 3).  
 
The reason that the sequential model precludes too much regulation is that uncertainty 
about the policy choices is avoided. Regulator ≠i will always be informed about 
regulators i choice and thus will not be faced with a first stage choice of deregulation 
once cost are above the diagonal line in area [5] of Figure 2. Thus the ability to 
communicate between regulators through sequential decision making avoids an 
equilibrium outcome of too much deregulation. 
 
Sequential decision making can however not preclude suboptimal reform absence. Behind 
this result is again the interaction of the reform efforts and the limited perspective of the 
partial authority acting as Stackelberg leader. With authority ≠i operating in the 
                                                 
28 The diagonal line in Figure 4 replicates the (A,A)-line in Figure 1. 
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intermediate cost range, authority i realizes that a decision to deregulate its own market 
will trigger similar efforts in market ≠i. Note, however, that a lower level of regulation in 
market ≠i is not necessarily a good thing from i’s perspective because of the empirically 
derived interaction term linking product and labor market reforms. In other words, 
triggering deregulation in market ≠i comes at a cost of a smaller marginal gain from 
deregulation for the leader. The planner follows in principle the same logic when 
contemplating the full reform option. However, in contrast to the planner, authority i 
takes a partial view on the benefits, ignoring or not being aware of the direct reform effect 
α≠i stemming from a lower level of regulation in the other market.  
 
 
C.   Summary and Extensions 
A first message stemming from the analysis of the social planner is that first-best 
deregulation can take a number of forms (Figure 1). The model illustrates that both partial 
or full reform can be optimal depending on circumstances. That said, however, it is 
worthwhile pointing out that optimal deregulation will often take the form of a 
comprehensive reform package. Unless deregulation costs are (very) asymmetric across 
markets, optimal deregulation is likely to involve both the labor and the product markets 
and require some form of coordination.  
 
The main message from the decentralized models is that deregulation choices are not 
always optimal if left to decision makers with a partial, market-by-market perspective. If 
decision makers interact in a simultaneous setup, reform efforts can either be insufficient 
or be excessive. The inefficiency has its roots in the interaction of reform efforts on the 
benefit side combined with the deregulators’ partial view: while the social planner 
considers the benefits from reform efforts in both markets, the players only take into 
account the benefits from their own reform effort and ignore the repercussions created by 
the interaction term in the benefit function. Ignoring the effect of the interaction term for 
the other player in a cost range where the planner would have refrained from reform can 
lead to excessive deregulation, when regulators give in to a “climate of reform” and 
coordinate accordingly. On the other hand, not taking into account the direct benefits of 
the other regulator’s efforts may lead to too little deregulation in a cost range where the 
social planner would have deregulated both markets. 
Because the sequential setup allows one player to step into the social planner’s shoes in 
anticipating the consequences of a coordinated reform effort, the excessive deregulation 
result can be avoided. However, the sequential outcome still suffers from the partial 
perspective of the players. As a consequence, deregulation efforts in the sequential game 
will fall short even compared to the “no reform” equilibrium in the simultaneous setup, 
since the regulator moving first fails to take into account the direct reform benefits that 
would be created by deregulation in the other market. 
So would coordination help to overcome the inefficiencies? The answer depends on the 
type of coordination being offered. Allowing one regulator to lead the reform process 
helps to avoid excessive regulation but at the price of too little reform. On the other hand, 
if reform decisions are made in a simultaneous fashion (e.g. by defining a multi-year 
government program), then coordination may be a helpful tool for equilibrium selection. 
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In principle, however, any coordination effort aimed at the first best will have to allow for 
some sort of side-payment between regulatory authorities (to overcome the partial 
perspective problem) and also coordination of activities (to allow taking account of the 
interaction effects). An added advantage of coordinating reform efforts across markets is 
that they might help to reduce the probability of “capture” through special interests at the 
partial market level—an issue we turn to next. 
There can be little doubt that political costs also influence decision-making when it comes 
to regulatory reform. Or, as the OECD (2004b, p. 17) puts it matter-of-factly for the 
example of German reforms in recent years: “Organized interest groups take part in 
consensus-driven decision-making. Over time this has led to a situation in which many 
players at different levels of the system [...] can block or stall progress in taking a 
decision.” In the framework developed above, this kind of activity translates into reforms 
becoming more costly.29 For instance, it is easy to show that the need for coordination 
prevails even when political economy considerations are added to the model (Berger and 
Danninger 2005a). The addition of (or an increase in) political costs, myopia, or short 
political tenure to the standard planer’s model affects the reform decision by inward 
shifting the boundary between the reform and no-reform areas in Figure 1—at a reduced 
level of perceived benefits of deregulation, lower reform costs are required to make 
deregulation worthwhile. If the shift is large enough relative to the actual level of reform 
costs in both markets, it may cause policymakers to forgo reforms even though 
deregulation would be socially optimal.  
 
 
V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we provide new evidence on the economic benefits of labor and product 
market reform. We show for a sample of OECD member countries that market 
deregulation is associated with a significant increase in aggregate employment growth. 
The effect relies in part on sizable interactions between labor and product market reforms 
linking the effectiveness of deregulation in one market to the level of regulation in the 
other market. Intuitively, liberalizing the labor market generates higher employment 
growth when the product market is more competitive, and vice versa. Comparable 
interaction effects have been reported in other studies, and their presence may help 
explain why the benefits of structural reforms have differed so much among industrial 
countries (e.g., Estevao, 2005; Kugler and Pica, 2004). 
We find that the employment effects are the largest when deregulation includes both labor 
and product markets, and the estimated employment gains can be sizable. A country 
moving from median levels of regulation to the lowest decile stands to gain about 
                                                 
29 Among the more influential papers on the political economy behind (de)regulation are Stigler (1971), 
Becker (1983), and Peltzman (1976, 1989), who stress the role of powerful interest groups. In a voting 
framework, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) argue that uncertainty about individual winners and losers can 
lead to a bias against reforms. Coate and Morris (1999) point out that adjustment to political action might 
inherently produce political pressures against (further) changes. Dewatripont and Roland (1995) show that, 
in a more complex political-economic setup, policy complementarities might be compatible with a gradual 
(or partial) reform approach, if this helps to build support for the overall policy program and “big bang” 
reforms are more costly to reverse. 
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1 percentage point in annual employment growth, partially due to sizable spillover 
effects. A caveat is that these findings—while rather robust along many dimensions—are 
based on a panel with only limited time variation in regulatory indicators. However, key 
results can be replicated in an alternative data set using regulatory indicators with more 
time variation but smaller coverage of the economy. 
The analysis of reform decisions shows deregulation choices are not always optimal if left 
to decision makers with a partial, market-by-market perspective. For instance, if 
regulators lack information about the direct effects of deregulation activities in other (yet 
connected) markets, “too much” or “too little” reform compared to the fist best outcome 
is possible. Adding the possibility for one regulator to commit ex ante to a regulation 
policy eliminates the case of excessive reform. Sequential decision making can however 
not prevent the possibility of suboptimal reform absence. Guaranteeing a first best 
outcome under decentralized decision making demands both the coordination of 
deregulation activities across markets and overcoming the partial perspective of 
regulators. If information deficits are behind the partial perspective—for instance, 
because of a lack of expertise in gauging the effects of the other authority’s regulatory 
activity—an organized information exchange between regulatory authorities might 
suffice. Another potential problem in this respect are political costs. A shorter-time 
horizon of policymakers or the need to appease organized interest groups can reduce net 
benefits and lead to reform absence, despite available welfare gains.  
Uncovering the underlying reasons for opposition to welfare-enhancing reform packages 
is crucial in this respect. If reforms are sidestepped because of a limited understanding of 
how benefits are distributed across labor and product markets, education of voters and 
policymakers can make a difference. For instance, unions might view labor market 
liberalization in a different light if they were undertaken simultaneously with 
competition-enhancing product market reforms and the beneficial interactions between 
both efforts were sufficiently communicated. The goal would then be to augment the 
partial objective functions or views of the regulation authorities. A different approach 
may need to be taken if benefit spillovers are not recognized because of political reasons. 
Here, transferring reform responsibilities to technical experts or other non partisan groups 
and insulating them from political pressures may work well. For sure, there is no simple 
policy solution and improving our understanding of reform effects and policy 
environments should be a priority for further research. 
 29
 References 
Alesina, Alberto, Silvia Ardagna, Guiseppe Nicoletti, and Fabio Schiantarelli, 2005, 
“Regulation and Investment,”, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 3, 
No. 4, pp. 791–825. 
Bruno A. and D. Gatti, 2004, Product Market Competition, Job Security, and Aggregate 
Employment, Oxford Economic Papers, No. 56, pp. 667–86. 
Annett, A., and X. Debrun, 2004, “Implementing Lisbon: Incentives and Constraints”, in 
Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report No. 04/235 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
Arpaia A. and G. Mourre, 2005. ”Labour Market Institutions and Labour Market 
Performance: A Survey of the Literature,” Labor and Demography 0512011, Economics 
Working Paper Archive EconWPA. 
Becker, Gary, 1983, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups For Political 
Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3, pp. 371-400. 
Berger, Helge, 1998, “Regulation in Germany: Some Stylized Facts about Its Time Path, 
Causes, and Consequences,” Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Vol. 
118, No. 2, pp. 185–220. 
Berger, Helge, and Stephan Danninger, 2005a,”Labor and Product Market Deregulation: 
Partial, Sequential, or Simultaneous Reform”, IMF Working Paper No. 05/227 
(Washington International Monetary Fund). 
Berger, Helge, and Stephan Danninger, 2005b,”Does Regulation Impede Growth in 
Germany?” in Germany: Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report No. 05/374 
(Washington International Monetary Fund). 
Bertola, G., F. Blau, and L. Kahn, 2002, “Comparative Analysis of Labor Market Outcomes: 
Lessons for the US from International Long-Run Evidence,” in The Roaring Nineties: 
Can Full Employment Be Sustained? ed. by A. Krueger and R. Solow (New York: 
Russell Sage and Century Foundations), pp. 159–218. 
Bertola, Giuseppe, Tito Boeri, and Sandrine Cazes, 1999, “Employment Protection and 
Labor Market Adjustment in OECD Countries: Evolving Institutions and Variable 
Enforcement,” Employment and Training Papers, No. 48 (Geneva: International Labor 
Office). 
Blanchard, Olivier, 2004, “The Economic Future of Europe,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 3-26. 
Blanchard, Olivier, and Francesco Giavazzi, 2003, “Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation 
and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
118, No. 3, pp. 879-907. 
Blanchard, Olivier, and J. Wolfers, 2000, “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of 
European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence,” Economic Journal, Vol. 110, 
No. 462, pp. C1–33. 
Boeri, Tito, Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefano Scarpetta, 2000, “Regulation and Labour Market 
Performance,” CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 2420. 
Boss, Alfred and Thomas Elender, 2005, “Incentives to Work: The Case of Germany,” Kiel 
Working Paper, No. 1237 (Kiel: Kiel Institute for World Economics). 
Burda, Michael, 2000, “Product Market Regulation and Labor Market Outcomes: How Can 
Deregulation Create Jobs?” CESifo Working Paper, No. 230 (Munich: Ifo Institute, 
Center for Economic Studies). 
 30
 Coate, Stephen, and Stephen Morris, 1999, “Policy Persistence,” American Economic 
Review, Vol. 89, No. 5, pp. 1327–36. 
Conway, Paul, Veronique Janod, and Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2005, “Product Market Regulation 
in OECD Countries: 1998 to 2003,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper, 419 
(Paris: OECD). 
Daveri, Francesco and Tabellini, Guido, 2000, “Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in 
Industrial Countries”, Economic Policy, 15 (30), 47-104. 
Dewatripont Mathias  and Gérard Roland (1995), The Design of Reform Packages Under 
Uncertainty, American Economic Review, 85(5), 1207-23. 
Ebell, Monique, and Christian Haefke, 2004, Product Market Deregulation and Labor Market 
Outcomes, IZA Discussion Paper No. 957 (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor). 
Ebell, Monique, and Christian Haefke, 2005, The Missing Link: Product Market Regulation, 
Collective Bargaining and the European Unemployment Puzzle, Typescript, Humboldt 
University. 
Estevão, Marcello, 2005, “Product Market Regulation and the Benefits of Wage 
Moderation,” IMF Working Paper, WP/05/191 (Washington: International Monetary 
Fund). 
Fernandez, Raquel, and Dani Rodrik, 1991, “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the 
Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty,” American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 
5, pp. 1146–55. 
Fertig, Michael, and Jochen Kluve, 2004, “A Conceptual Framework for the Evaluation of 
Comprehensive Labor Market Policy Reforms in Germany,” IZA Working Paper, No. 
1099 (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor). 
Hughes Hallet, A. and S. Jensen and C. Richter (2005) “The European Economy at Cross 
Roads: Structural Reforms, Fiscal Constraints and the Lisbon Agenda”, Research in 
International Business and Finance, 19, 229-50. 
International Monetary Fund, 2005, “Germany—2005 Article IV Consultation, Concluding 
Statement of the Mission,” http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2005/062805.htm. 
Jean, Sébastien, and Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2004, “Regulation and Wage Premia,” CEPII 
Working Paper No. 2004–12 (Paris: Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales). 
Kauppi, Hauppi, Erkki Koskela, and Rune Stenbacka, 2004, “Equilibrium Unemployment 
and Capital Intensity Under Product and Labor Market Imperfections,” CESifo Working 
Paper, No. 1343 (Munich: Ifo Institute, Center for Economic Studies). 
Koeniger, Winfried, and Andrea Vindigni, 2003, “Employment Protection and Product 
Market Regulation,” IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 880 (Bonn: Institute for the Study 
of Labor). 
Krueger, Alan and Jon-Steffen Pischke (1997) Observations and Conjectures on the U.S. 
Employment Miracle, NBER Working Paper No. 6146. 
Kugler, Adriana, Giovanni Pica, 2004, “Effects of Employment Protection and Product 
Market Regulations on the Italian Labor Market,” CEPR Working Paper 4216. 
Messina Julian (2004) Institutions and Service Employment: A Panel Study for OECD 
Countries, ECB Working Paper No. 320, March. 
Nickell, Stephen 2003, “Labour Market  Institutions and Unemployment in OECD 
Countries”, Cesifo Dice Report, Vol. 2,. pp. 13-26. 
 31
 Nickell, Stephen, Luca Nunziata, and Wolfgang Ochel, 2005, “Unemployment in the OECD 
Since the 1960s. What do We Know?” The Economics Journal, 115, pp. 1–27. 
Nicoletti, Giuseppe Robert Haffner, Steve Nickell, Stefano Scarpetta and Gylfi Zoega, 2001, 
“European Integration, Liberalization and Labor-Market Performance,” in G. Bertola, T. 
Boeri and G. Nicoletti (eds.), Welfare and Employment in United Europe, The MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Nicoletti, Giuseppe, and Frederic L. Pryor, 2001, “Subjective and Objective Measures of the 
Extent of Governmental Regulations,” Working Paper (Washington: AEI-Brookings 
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies). 
Nicoletti, Giuseppe, and Stefano Scarpetta, 2003, “Regulation, Productivity, and Growth: 
OECD Evidence,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2944 (Washington: 
World Bank). 
Nicoletti, Giuseppe, and Stefano Scarpetta, 2005, “Product Market Reforms and Employment 
in OECD Countries,” Economics Department Working Paper No. 472, OECD, Paris. 
Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Stefano Scarpetta, and O. Boylaud, 2000, “Summary Indicators of 
Product Market Regulation with an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation,” 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 226, OECD, Paris. 
OECD, 2001, Economics Outlook, (Paris). 
OECD, 2004a, Employment Outlook, (Paris). 
OECD, 2004b, “OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Germany, Consolidating Economic 
and Social Renewal,” (Paris). 
OECD, 2005, “Going for Growth,” Economic Policy Reforms (Paris). 
Peltzman, Sam, 1976, “Toward A More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 9, No.2, pp. 211-40. 
Peltzman, Sam, 1989, “The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of 
Deregulation,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, pp. 1-41. 
Potters, J., and Frans van Winden, 1996, “Models of Interest Groups: Four Different 
Approaches”, in Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, ed. 
By N. Schofield (Boston: Kluwer) pp. 337-62. 
Saint Paul, Gilles, 1997, Dual Labor Markets, A Macroeconomic Perspective (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
Snower, Dennis and Dave Coe (1997), Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental 
Labor Market Reform” IMF Staff Papers, 44(1), March, 1-35. 
Stigler, George, 1971, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, The Bell Journal of 
Economics, Spring, Vol. 2, pp. 3-21. 
Winston, Clifford, 1993, “Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for 
Microeconomists,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 1263-89. 
Young, David, 2003, “Employment Protection Legislation: Its Economic Impact and the 
Case for Reform,” European Economy Economic Papers, No. 186. 
 32
